Following study, participants receired 2 tests The 1st was a recognition test, the 2nd was designed to tap recollection The objective mas to examine performance on Test 1 conditional on Test 2 performance In Experiment 1, contrary to process dissociation assumptions, exclusion errors better predicted subsequent recollection than did inclusion errors In Experiments 2 and 3, with alternate questions posed on Test 2, mords haling high estimates of recollection mith one question had high estimates of familiarity 41th the other question Results supported the following (a) the 2-test procedure has considerable potential for elucidating the relationship between recollection and familiarity, (b) there is substantial eridence for dependency betmeen such processes mhen estimates are obtained using the process dissociation and remember-know procedures, and (c) order of information access appears to depend on the question posed to the memory system In response to the question of why they believe a word occurred in a study list, people often report remembering how they processed the word (e.g., they remember solving it as an anagram), details about how the word was presented (e.g., the modality of presentation), and idiosyncratic reactions to the word (e.g., its personal significance). The emergence into consciousness of such detail is generally referred to as recollection, or recollective expe-
(see the many examples of extended reasoning processes discussed by Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; and Mandler's, 1980 , discussion of an undifferentiated feeling of familiarity)-there are many unanswered questions about these two constructs.
In recent years, much of the evidence for the distinction between recollection and familiarity has been based on the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 2002) . In this procedure, a participant either studies two lists or studies a list containing two types of items (e.g., auditorially and visually presented words). At test, the participant is asked to make one of two recognition decisions: say "yes" if the test item is old and .'no'' if it is new (inclusion instructions); or say "yes" if the item is of one type (in one list) and "no" if it is the other type (other list) or is new (exclusion instructions). We represent the state of correctly saying "yes" to an old item under inclusion instructions as I and the state of incorrectly saying "yes" to an old item under exclusion instructions as E. Likewise, we refer to the state of having recollection as R and the state of having sufficient familiarity to say "yes" as F. Jacoby (1991) assumed that in the inclusion condition, the participant will respond "yes" if the item is familiar or if they recollect (Equation 1): P(1) = P(F) + P(R) -P(F)P(R).
(1)
In the exclusion condition, when the participant should be responding "no", it is assumed that they will mistakenly respond "yes" if the item is familiar but they fail to recollect which list it occurred in (Equation 2):
These equations can be solved for P(R) and P(F) giving the following (Equations 3 and 4):
' W e include perceptual fluency (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) within the concept of a subsymbolic process Jacoby and Brooks's (1984) concept of a nonanalytic process and Humphreys and Bain's (1983) concept of information that mas correlated with the learning context but not descriptive of the learning context are also similar P(R) = P(1) -P(E) and P(F) = P(E)/[1 -P(1) + P(E)].
( 3 ) (4)
The remember-know paradigm (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985) is also intimately associated with the concept of recollection. In this paradigm participants are asked whether they recognize an item because they remember some aspect of its presentation or because they know that it is old. Jacoby, Jones, and Dolan (1998) have suggested that the response of know is equivalent to finding an item familiar but failing to recollect. In this article, we refer to the set of assumptions underlying the process dissociation procedure and the proposed relationship with the remember-know paradigm as the process dissociation framework.
Certain constraints on the concept of recollection are required if the process dissociation procedure is to produce meaningful estimates of the P(R) and P(F). The assumption that has received most discussion is the assumption that recollection and familiarity are independent (Brainerd, Reyna, & Mojardin, 1999; Dodson & Johnson, 1996; Humphreys, Dennis, Chalmers, & Finnigan, 2000; Mulligan & Hirshman, 1997; Yonelinas, 2002) . Also addressed in this article is a second assumption that is central to the process dissociation procedure: the assumption that there is no change in the information that emerges from the memory-access process with the change in instructions from the inclusion to exclusion condition.
There are two theories that have been applied to the process dissociation and remember-know procedures that assume a directed search process; that is, both theories assume that the change in instructions determines not only which information emerges from the memory-access process but additionally the order of that emergence. Dennis and Humphreys (2001) proposed that memory decisions in a variety of tasks, including recognition, list discrimination, and source monitoring, are based on a match between a reinstated context and a context that is retrieved using the probe item as the cue. Dennis and Humphreys also assumed that the reinstated context would depend, at least in part, on the test instructions: what someone was looking for or was asked to do. That is, Dennis and Humphreys's theory assumes that the information reinstated when a participant is asked to identify visually presented items tends to match the information stored with visually presented items and to mismatch the information stored with auditorially presented items. If we also assume that the strength of the feeling of familiarity is proportional to the strength of the match, this theory predicts that visually presented items will appear more familiar when the participant is trying to identify visually presented items, and auditorially presented items will appear more familiar when the participant is trying to identify auditorially presented items. Banks (2000) obtained a similar result using very different processing assumptions. Banks proposed that memories reside in a multidimensional space where auditorially presented items tend to occur in one location, visually presented items in a somewhat different location, new items in yet another location, and so on. At test, participants are assumed to locate a decision axis in the space that optimizes the required decision. For example, the decision axis for old-new recognition will differ from the decision axis for an auditory-visual source monitoring decision, and the decision axis for an exclusion condition will be a compromise between the decision axes for the old-new and source monitoring judgments. If we assume that the feeling of familiarity depends on the position of an item on the decision axis, then this model also assumes that both the information available for a decision and the individual's subjective experience critically depend on the question the participant is trying to answer. Dennis and Humphreys (2001) also assumed that the matching operation allows some specific (symbolic) information to emerge into consciousness (recollection). In addition, the reinstated context tends to control which specific information would emerge of the possible information that could emerge. That is, participants would be more likely to become consciously aware of details about the visual presentation of an item if they had reinstated a visual context than if they had reinstated an auditory context. In the Final Discussion section, we contrast the directed search process of Banks (2000) and Dennis and Humphreys with the kind of undirected search process that seems to underlie various other theories regarding recollection.
The theories of Dennis and Humphreys (2001) and Banks (2000) are probably incompatible with the process dissociation procedure, as it now exists, because the procedure requires that participants make very different decisions in the inclusion and exclusion conditions. In addition, Dennis and Humphreys's theory assumes that recollection and familiarity rely on the same stored memories and are therefore unlikely to be independent. However, neither theory is necessarily incompatible with other ideas about recollection. In particular, we refer to the source monitoring framework of Johnson and her colleagues (Johnson et al., 1993; Qin et al., 2001 ) but note that the source monitoring framework appears to locate control in a postmemory-access decision process, not the predecision memory-access process, where both Dennis and Humphreys and Banks located an important component of control.
We designed the current experiments to test the assumptions that differentiate what we refer to as the process dissociation framework from the theories proposed by Dennis and Humphreys (2001) and Banks (2000) . The specific concerns are whether recollection and familiarity are independent at the item level and whether there is a change in the order in which information emerges from the memory-access process with a change in instructions. In all three experiments, participants received two tests following a study phase. The first test was a variant on a recognition test. In Experiment 1, the test was one of the two process dissociation conditions (inclusion or exclusion). The second test was designed to tap recollection or a component of recollection. In Experiment 1, the test was a cued recall test (some of the study items had been presented in pairs). Our assumption, on the basis of the logic of the process dissociation procedure, was that performance on Test 2 would be related to performance on Test 1, when performance on Test 1 was determined by recollection. Using an item to recall the item with which it has been paired is the recall process proposed by Mandler (1980) as contributing to recognition. Jacoby and Kelley (1 992) and Yonelinas (1 994) have also indicated that this sort of recall is a component of recollection.
More generally, we expected that recall on Test 2 might be correlated with many aspects or types of recollection on Test 1, not just with recall on Test 1. Thus, in Experiment 1, we expected that recall on Test 2 could be affected by whether recollection occurred on Test 1, but in the absence of recollection on Test 1, there would be no relationship between the presence, or absence, or amount of familiarity on Test 1 and recall on Test 2.
These ideas about the relationship between Test 1 and Test 2 performance can be addressed more formally. In the process dissociation procedure, there are two identifiable states where recollection is assumed to have failed. One is the state of failing to recognize an old item in the inclusion condition (an inclusion error). The process dissociation procedure assumes that this state occurs with probability:
The second is the state of falsely recognizing an old word under exclusion instructions (an exclusion error). The process dissociation procedure assumes that this state occurs with probability, P(E) = [ 1 -P(R)]P(F). Thus, the ratio of the probability of State 1 to the probability of State 2 is [ 1 -P(I)]/P(E) = [ 1 -P(F)]/P(F). In Equation 5 , we show that, because of the independence assumption, the ratio of the conditional probabilities also equals [ l -P(F)]/P(F). Note that in Equation 5 , Rc refers to the state of successful recall on Test 2. A bar over a state refers to the complement of that state. Hence, I refers to the state of saying "yes" to an old item under inclusion instructions and ?refers to the state of saying "no" to an old item under inclusion instructions.
The first step in the derivation follows from the definition of conditional probability.
The next step follows from the assumption that lack of familiarity is independent of recall and recollection.
In the next step, we multiply the numerator and the denominator by m. P(R n Rc) P(F) P(F)/P(Rc) P(F) = The next step follows from the assumption that familiarity is independent of recall and recollection. P(R n Rc n F) P(F)/P(Rc) P(F) = The next step follows again from the definition of conditional probability.
In the final step, the first expression in the derivation is set equal to the last expression (P(R n FIRc) = P(R n FIRc) P(F)/P(F) and the terms are rearranged to give P(R n FIRc)/P(R n FIRc) = P(F)/P(F).
( 5 )
Thus, a straightforward test of the process dissociation procedure's assumptions is to compare the unconditional and conditional ratios of an inclusion error to an exclusion error. If these ratios are significantly different, then the assumption of independence between recollection and familiarity is incorrect.
Experiment 1
All participants studied two lists. For half of the participants, the two lists consisted of randomly formed pairs of words. For the remaining half, the first list consisted of pairs and the second list of single items. In addition, the two lists were either studied adjacently, with a retention interval following the second list (pretest interval, LlL2-T), or the two lists were separated by an interval, with the process dissociation test immediately following the second list (interlist interval, L 1-L2T). All participants were given two tests. The first test was a standard process dissociation test in which single items were presented and participants made either inclusion or exclusion judgments. The second test consisted of the same items in the same order, but this test required that participants use the test item to recall the item with which it had been paired at study.
Method
Participants. Three hundred and twenty students from the University of Queensland participated in the experiment for credit in first-year psychology courses.
A 2 X 2 X 2 X 3 factorial design was used. The independent variables were test instruction (inclusion or exclusion), temporal similarity (the interlist interval is low and the pretest interval is high), processing similarity (high processing similarity, where both lists were studied as pairs, or low processing similarity, where List 1 was studied as pairs and List 2 as single words), and type of test word (List 1, List 2, or new). Test instruction, temporal similarity, and processing similarity were betweensubjects variables, whereas type of test word was a within-subjects variable.
Materials. The stimuli were 100 five-letter words of intermediate frequency (12-50 occurrences per million) derived from 1994 issues of The Sydney Morning Herald (TSMH Word Database; Dennis, 1995) . To control the retention interval for the individual items tested, word pairs were assigned to either the first or second half of each study list for both List 1 and List 2. The test list was then constructed to maintain the test-half order in which items had been presented during study. Furthermore, the item tested from each pair within a list half (left vs. right member in first half; left vs. right member in second half) was counterbalanced across participants, such that half the participants were tested on left members from the first half of a list and right members from the second half of a list for both List 1 and List 2, and vice versa. The addition of two classes of new words-those occurring in either the first or second half of the test list-meant that items cycled through a total of 20 counterbalancing conditions across the two study lists and the two test forms, with words occurring equally often in each condition. Note that to create the singleitem lists, we simply split the pairs (after counterbalancing), presenting the left member then the right member of a pair consecutively, instead of concurrently.
Procedure. Table 1 outlines the procedure that was followed by each of the participants. The 3 min of puzzle practice was designed to ensure that participants could proceed immediately into the filler tasks at either
Step 3 or 5 without becoming confused about the task requirements.
Design.

Table 1
Procediwe fov Expeviment 1
Step Procedure Each of the study lists contained 40 words. List 1 words were always presented in pairs. List 2 words appeared either as pairs (high processing similarity condition) or as single items (low processing similarity condition). Word pairs were presented for 6 s and participants were told to learn the pairs so that given one item they could recall the other item. Single items were presented for 3 s and participants were told to learn each item so that if the item was presented at test they would be able to identify it as being a member of the list. The interlist and pretest intervals consisted of 10 min of puzzle activity either between the two lists (interlist or low temporal similarity) or between List 2 and the test (pretest or high temporal similarity). The puzzle task required that participants use a mouse to move tiles around a 6 X 6 grid to complete a geometric pattern.
Following the study lists and the filler activity, participants received a recognition test and then a recall test. The recognition and recall test lists contained the same words in the same order. The order was maintained to ensure that the context during the recall test was as similar as possible to that during the recognition test. There were 60 words in each test list (20 from each study list-1 from each pair if the words were in pairs-and 20 new words).
During the recognition test, participants responded on a 6-point confidence scale, where 1 indicated that the participant believed the word definitely did not appear and 6 indicated that the participant believed the word definitely did appear. Participants in the inclusion condition were asked if the word appeared in either list. Participants in the exclusion condition were asked if the word appeared in List 2 but not in List 1. The recognition test was self-paced.
During the final recall test, as each word appeared, the participant was required to type the word that it was paired with in the study phase, if they believed that it occurred in a pair, and could recall the other item.
Results
Recognition. First, we examine the recognition results. Table 2 shows the probability of a "yes" response as a function of condition. Note that participants responded on a 6-point scale. Responses in the top three categories (4, 5, and 6) were pooled to determine the proportion of "yes" responses.
Because of the relatively small standard errors and the multiple comparisons that are possible, most of the significant effects in the data can be ascertained by a comparison of the mean differences that takes into account the size of the standard errors. We consider a difference of two standard errors or greater as significant. The recognition results were largely as expected. With both inclusion and exclusion instructions, performance on List 2 items was better with an interlist interval than with a pretest interval. This was expected because the retention interval for these items was less in the former condition. Both the interval manipulation and the processing similarity manipulation tended to leave inclusion performance unchanged but reduce exclusion performance. However, the interval manipulation also changed the false-alarm rate for new items. This change in the false-alarm rate seems reliable as it was also found in a previous experiment using these two conditions with lists of single words (Hall, 1996) . Table 3 shows the probability of recall as a function of instructions, interval placement, and processing similarity. Recall performance on List 1 items ranged from a low o f . 14 to a high of .22, and there appeared to be little tendency for performance to be affected by either of the similarity manipulations. However, with an interlist interval, where the retention interval for List 2 was shorter, there may have been a tendency for recall to be better for List 2 than for List 1 items. Table 4 shows the probability of recognition conditional on correct recall for List 1 items (List 2 items were presented singly for half the participants). Note that when participants had a zero probability of recalling a List 1 item, they were dropped from this analysis. The resulting n values are included in Table 4 .
In the inclusion conditions, where recall should be a basis for saying "yes", the conditional probability was higher than the unconditional probability in all four conditions. This finding supports the assumption that recollection on Test 1 is predicted from recall on Test 2. In addition, the conditional exclusion probab in the low processing similarity conditions were less than the unconditional probab es and less than the conditional exclusion probabilities in the high processing similarity conditions. This finding supports the assumption that, when appropriate, participants used recall (recollection) to exclude List 1 items.
However, the predicted invariance in the ratios of the conditional and unconditional probabilities was violated. That is, the ratio of failing to recognize an old item under inclusion instructions to falsely recognizing an old item under exclusion instructions was substantially larger for the unconditional than for the conditional probabilities for all four comparisons (see Table 5 ). Because the ratios were based on the performance of a group of participants in the inclusion condition and another group in the exclusion condition, it was not possible to directly assess the significance of the difference. A bootstrapping procedure (Efron & 
Recall.
Recognition conditional on recall. Tibshirani, 1993) was used to estimate the 95% confidence intervals for the differences between the ratios. For each of the eight between-participants conditions, 2,000 random samples from the participants were created. Sampling was done with replacement, and the sample size was the number of participants in that condition who had recalled one or more List 1 items on the final recall test (see the n values in Table 4 ). For each sample in the inclusion conditions, the probability of an inclusion error, P(T), and the same probability conditional on correct recall were calculated. Likewise, for each sample in the exclusion conditions, the probability of an exclusion error, P(E), and the same probability conditional on correct recall were calculated. For each of the four conditions defined by the combinations of temporal and processing similarity, a sample from the inclusion condition was randomly yoked to a sample from the corresponding exclusion condition. The two yoked samples were then used to calculate the ratio of PO) to P(E) and the same ratio of the conditional probabilities. The ratio of the conditional probabilities was then subtracted from the ratio of the unconditional probabilities. The 95% confidence interval was determined by excluding the values that fell in the upper and lower 2.5% of the distribution of differences. These values are presented in Table 5 . For three of the four combinations of processing and temporal similarity, the 95% confidence interval for the difference distribution did not include the value of zero (which supports the rejection of the null hypothesis that the ratios are equal).
Discussion
Performance on the final recall test was correlated with performance on the earlier test in a manner that is consistent with the assumption that final recall is correlated with earlier recollection. However, the ratio of the inclusion errors to the exclusion errors was substantially larger for the unconditional probabilities than it was for the conditional probabilities. This finding was significant for three of the four combinations of processing and temporal similarity. The difference between the ratios was not significant in the low temporal similarity-low processing similarity condition. However, in this condition the mean of the conditional ratio calculated on the resamples was not close to the mean of the original sample. This may be an indication that the bootstrapping procedure was inappropriate for this condition. However, in the other three conditions the means of the resamples were very close to the means of the original samples, an indication that for these conditions the bootstrapping results were acceptable. We concluded that successful recall on Test 2 was more likely to follow an exclusion error (familiarity without recollection) on Test 1 than an inclusion error (neither familiarity nor recollection) on Test 1. The same pattern of results can also be seen in data from Knowlton and Squire (1995, Experiment 3) . In their experiment participants made remember-know judgments after a 10-min delay and again, on the same items, after a 1-week delay. If we make the same assumption as Jacoby et al. (1998) that the probability of a know response equals [1 -P(R)]P(F), then the ratio of the probability of a new response to the probability of a know response equals [1 -P(F)]/P(F). This same ratio holds for the conditional probabilities, Participants in Knowlton and Squire's experiment were 2.55 times more likely to make a new response than a know response at the 10-min interval. However, when new and know responses at 10 min were conditionalized on a remember response at 1 week, this ratio reduced from 2.55: 1 .OO to 1.16: 1 .OO. That is, a much higher proportion of the know responses at 10 min were followed by a remember response at 1 week than the proportion of new responses later followed by a remember response. Assuming that remember responses indicate recollection and know responses indicate familiarity, the reduction in the ratio from the uncondi- Table 5 The P(I):P(E) and P(I~Rc):P(E~Rc) Ratios ,Vole. P(I) = probability of not recognizing with inclusion instructions; P(E) = probability of falsely recognizing with exclusion instructions; PGIRc) = probability of not recognizing with inclusion instructions conditional on successful recall; P(E1Rc) = probability of falsely recognizing with exclusion instructions conditional on successful recall; MOR = mean of resamples; OSV = original sample values; CI = confidence intenal.
tional to conditional probabilities demonstrates a degree of dependency between recollection and familiarity.2 Part of the discrepancy between the ratios for the unconditional and conditional probabilities in our experiment can be attributed to a problem with the process dissociation procedure that has already been documented. That is, as processing similarity increases, there is a reduction in the estimates of recollection and an increase in the estimates of familiarity provided by the procedure (Dodson & Johnson, 1996; Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley 1997; Mulligan & Hirshman, 1997; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996) . Yonelinas and Jacoby have interpreted this finding as a shift from criterial to noncriterial recollection. For example, in the high processing similarity conditions, recall would be criterial in the inclusion conditions (it discriminates between presented and nonpresented words) but noncriterial in the exclusion conditions (it does not discriminate between List 1 and List 2). The information that shifts in diagnostic value going from inclusion to exclusion instructions is correlated with final cued-recall performance. Because of this correlation, there is also a shift in the ratios going from the unconditional to the conditional probabilities.
The large discrepancy between the ratios of the conditional and unconditional probabilities in the high processing similarity conditions was likely a result of the shift in the diagnostic value of recall. However, this explanation is insufficient to explain our results in their entirety, as there was also a discrepancy between the ratios of the conditional and unconditional probabilities in the low processing similarity conditions and the bootstrapping methodology indicates that one of these differences was significant. Additionally, it does not explain Knowlton and Squire's (1995) results, as there should be no shift in the diagnostic value of recollection from one test to a later test of the same type.
Although the results suffice to establish that exclusion errors (familiarity without recollection) have a closer relationship with measures of recollection than do inclusion errors (neither familiarity nor recollection), we cannot determine from these data whether there is some fundamental dependency between the underlying memory representations or whether this relationship results from problems with the methodology. One possibility is that there is a subset of items where no learning occurred during study (e.g., a participant had their eyes closed). This would make it difficult to estimate familiarity using either the process dissociation procedure or the remember-know paradigm but would not represent a fundamental dependency between familiarity and recollection. Another possibility is that recollection is present to some degree when participants respond know or when they make an exclusion error. Again, this would indicate a problem with the methodology but would not necessarily constitute a fundamental dependency between recollection and familiarity.
Other possibilities, however, do suggest that there is a fundamental dependency between recollection and familiarity. One possibility in Knowlton and Squire's (1995) data is that some of the remember responses on the delayed test resulted from learning that occurred during the first test. Note, however, that this explanation requires the learning rate to be 2.20 times as high following a know response than it is following a new response. That is, if the same learning rate applies to all items on the first test, it would produce no difference between the ratios of the unconditional and conditional probabilities. It is possible that participants paid more attention when responding know than when responding new, so that differential attention produced the differential learning rate. It is also possible, however, that test-trial learning built on earlier learning and there was more earlier learning for items for which the response was know than for items for which the response was new. That is, a test-trial learning explanation is certainly compatible with a fundamental relationship between recollection and familiarity. Nonetheless, test-trial learning seems an unlikely explanation for the results of the low processing similarity conditions in Experiment 1. To produce the change between the ratios of the unconditional and conditional probabilities, there would have to have been more learning following an exclusion error than that following an inclusion error. However, it seems difficult to strengthen an association with the other member of an unrelated Our analysis where we shom that knom responses at 10 min tend to become remember responses at 1 week complements Knomlton and Squire's (1995) analysis, u hich demonstrated that remember responses on the 10-min test tended to become know responses at 1 week Flexser and Tuhing (1982) have proposed that recall can be facilitated by presenting one member of a study pair, even when the participant fails to recognize that member Houe\er, Flexser and Tulving's model assumes that the same trace must be contacted for both recognition and recall Thus, the model postulates a fundamental dependency between what is now referred to as recollection and familiarity study pair unless that pair member can be r e~a l l e d .~
In the low processing similarity conditions, recall of the other member of the pair should have been very good evidence that the test item came from List 1 not List 2 (which were studied as single items), so that if recall had occurred, there should not have been an exclusion error.
The only remaining possibility is that the results of Experiment 1 and Knowlton and Squire's (1995) results reflect trial-totrial variability in recollection. One explanation is that the variability derives from a lowering of the threshold for responding remember (Donaldson, 1996; Hirshman & Master, 1997) . If we make this assumption, then the results indicate that remember and know responses depend on the same information but that more information (a higher criterion) is required before a participant will respond remember. This, however, seems to be an unlikely explanation for Experiment 1, as it has been shown that cued recall is resistant to criterion manipulations (Jorm & Bain, 1978) . Alternatively, some or all of the variability may result from contextual changes between the two tests. By itself, an assumption of trialto-trial variability in memory access that is controlled by context will not explain why familiarity is more likely to turn into recollection with a change in context than is the absence of familiarity.
To explain this dependency, we can assume that both recollection and familiarity require contact with the same memory trace (Flexser & Tulving, 1982) , require contact with the same interlinked set of memory traces (Johnson et al., 1993) , or represent different ways to access the same memory (Banks, 2000; Dennis & Humphreys, 2001; Humphreys, Bain, & Pike, 1989) . All of these are means to achieve a fundamental dependency between recollection and familiarity or, more generally, between the memory states underlying exclusion errors and know responses on the one hand and inclusion errors and new responses on the other.
In conclusion, Experiment 1 and our analysis of Knowlton and Squire's (1995) results provide evidence that there is a dependency between estimates of recollection and familiarity derived from the process dissociation and remember-know procedures. However, the methodology used cannot tell us whether this dependency is the result of a procedural artifact of the process dissociation and remember-know procedures or whether it represents a fundamental dependency between the memory states involved. In the remaining experiments, we use a somewhat different but related methodology to provide evidence on this issue.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, participants studied a list containing visually and auditorially presented words. They received a rememberknow test that was followed by a source monitoring test presented in an exclusion format. That is, half the participants were required to say "yes" if the test item had been presented visually, and "no" if it had been presented auditorially, or if it was new (the visual memory condition). The remaining half of the participants were required to say "yes" if the test item had been presented auditorially, and "no" if it had been presented visually, or if it was new (the auditory memory condition).
Instead of comparing the ratio of the conditional and unconditional probabilities, we calculated the probability of saying "yes" to the source monitoring question (Test 2) conditional on the response made on the remember-know test (Test 1). Our assumption, on the basis of the process dissociation framework, was that a remember response on Test 1 would be an indicator of those items for which recollection was more likely on Test 2. We also anticipated that the presence of recollection on Test 1 would increase the probability of saying "yes" on Test 2 when the source monitoring question was congruent with a test word's study status (e.g., a remember response was made to an auditorially presented word on Test 1 and the Test 2 question asked for auditory information) and decrease the probability of saying "yes" when it was incongruent with a test word's study status (e.g., a remember response was made to an auditorially presented word on Test 1 and the Test 2 question asked for visual information).
An alternative to the process dissociation assumptions is that words will appear more familiar and/or be more likely to support correct recollection when the study condition is congruent with the test instructions and, conversely, that words will appear less familiar or be less likely to support correct recollection (and may even be more likely to support incorrect recollection) when the study condition is incongruent with the test instructions (Banks, 2000; Dennis & Humphreys, 2001 ). There is some evidence for this possibility. Marsh and Hicks (1998) looked at a source monitoring task presented in the exclusion format. In two experiments, they observed that accuracy varied depending on which way the test question was phrased. Their conclusion was that the information examined by the participant could depend on test instructions.
If recollection is greater for congruent information than for incongruent information, the following predictions ensue: For those items having a study status congruent with their test condition, there will be a greater probability of a "yes" response on the source monitoring task, conditional on a remember response on Test 1, than the same probability conditional on a know response. This is the same prediction made by the process dissociation framework. For those items having a study status incongruent with their test condition, any reduction in the probability of recollection (which could be used to exclude items) would increase the probability of saying "yes" on the source monitoring task, conditional on a remember response on Test 1, relative to the same probability conditional on a know response. This prediction is contrary to that made by the process dissociation framework.
Method
Participants. Thirty introductory psychology students and 10 volunteers from outside the university participated in the experiment. The introductory psychology students participated as part of a course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to the two between-subjects conditions based on their order of arrival.
All participants studied a list of 80 words: Half were presented visually and half were presented auditorially. Participants received a 120-word recognition task (40 read, 40 heard, and 40 new items) where they were required to make a remember-know-new judgment for each word. That is, did they remember some aspect of having studied the word, know that it was old, or believe it to be new? Following the recognition task participants completed a source monitoring task. Half the participants were asked to say "yes" to words they had read, and "no" to words they had heard and to new words (the visual memory condition). The other half were asked to say "yes" to words they had heard, and "no" to words they had read and to new words (the auditory memory condition).
A total of 120 five-letter words of intermediate frequency (1 1-39 occurrences per million), obtained from TSMH Word Database (Dennis, 1995) , were used in the experiment. For each participant the 120 Design.
Materials.
n ords n ere randomly dii ided into three 40-item lists that n ere assigned to the three within-subject conditions (read, heard, and new)
The experiment consisted of three phases one study phase and two test phases The study phase and the first test phase were separated by a 3-min distractor task On arrii al at the laboratory, participants n ere assigned to a condition and gii en a brief overi iem of the experiment The experiment was computer administered and detailed instructions were prorided on screen before each phase commenced Prior to the study phase, participants mere informed that they nould be presented n ith 80 n ords (half i isually and half auditonally) They n ere instructed to pay attention to the words and try to memorize them for the subsequent memory tasks, the type of tasks they would receive were not specified before study The 40 read mords mere presented one at a time in the center of the computer screen for 3 s The 40 heard nords nere presented through earphones connected to the computer Each heard word was spoken twice in the space of 3 s (once at 0 s and again at 1 5 s) The order of presentation of the read and heard n ords mas randomized for each participant Immediately folloming the presentation of the 80 n ords, instructions for the distractor task appeared on screen Participants nere informed that they would see a 6 X 6 grid of patterned tiles and that their task was to use the mouse to move the tiles around the grid to form the correct pattern
All participants mere then presented 41th detailed instructions for the first memory test The instructions closely resembled those used by Gardiner, Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (1998) Participants were informed that a list of mords nould be presented, one mord at a time, on the center of the computer screen and that some of the n ords n ere old, that is, they were words they had either seen or heard during the study phase, and that other words were new An explanation of the two different kinds of memory experience, remember and knom, mas then provided Participants mere instructed to discriminate the n ords they recognized from the study list (old) from those that were new In addition, they were asked to characterize their memory for the words they did recognize into a separate remember or know judgment The experimenter proi ided additional verbal explanations and examples to clarify the distinction betmeen remember and knon judgments for those participants who requested them During the recognition test, each of the 120 words remained on screen until the participant made a response Folloning a response, the next nord nas presented Belon each mord mere three boxes, labeled iemember, know, and new Participants were asked to click the new box if they did not recognize the word as haring been either read or heard during the study phase For those nords participants did recognize, they mere asked to click remember if their recognition mas accompanied by some recollectire experience and know if their recognition was accompanied by strong feelings of familiarity but no conscious recollection
The source monitoring test immediately follon ed the recognition test Participants nere informed that they mould see the same 120 mords used in the first test, one at a time, on the center of the computer screen Below each word were two boxes labeled ves and no Participants assigned to the visual memory condition n ere asked to click the "yes" box if they remembered seeing the n ord during the original study phase and to click the "no" box if they remembered hearing the word or if they thought the word was not presented during the study phase Participants in the auditory memory condition mere asked to click the "yes" box if they remembered hearing the n ord during the study phase and to click the "no" box if they remembered seeing the mord during the study phase or if they thought the n ord n as not presented during the study phase Each word remained on screen until a response of "yes" or "no" was made Following a response, the next word appeared The source monitoring test contained the same mords presented in the same order as the recognition test
At the completion of the second test phase, participants n ere required to complete a short questionnaire to ensure that they had understood the Procedui e distinction betmeen memory experience that justified a remember judgment and that which warranted a know judgment, on the first recognition test
Results
An inspection of the responses on the postexperiment questionnaire revealed 10 of the 40 participants (4 in the visual memory condition and 6 in the auditory memory condition) may not have understood the remember-know distinction, although it is possible that they were just responding carelessly on the questionnaire. Excluding the data of these 10 participants from the subsequent analyses resulted in very little change relative to analyses conducted on all 40 participants. We thus decided to present the analyses conducted on all 40 participants and indicate those instances where an analysis that excluded the doubtful participants would have produced a different interpretation.
Recognition. Table 6 shows the mean probability of responding remember and old (remember plus know) along with the standard error of the mean for each type of test item. The results are presented separately for the two memory conditions, although at this point the participants had been treated identically. Comparisons of the standard errors of the means show that, with the exception of the probability of a remember response to read words (which was higher in the visual memory condition than in the auditory memory condition), there were only small differences between the participants who were assigned to the two memory conditions of the second test. For this reason, we collapsed the data over the two conditions to compare performance on the three types of items (read, heard, and new). Planned comparisons indicate the probability of an old response was greater for old words (read or heard) than for new words, F(1, 39) = 361.55, MSE = 0.011, and greater for heard words than for read words, F(1, 39) = 6.29, Table 7 contains the probability of saying "yes" on the source monitoring task as a function of the type of item (read, heard, or new) and type of source monitoring (visual or auditory memory).
The two planned comparisons conducted within each source monitoring condition were dictated by the exclusion task instantiated by the condition. The first comparison was between old items participants were required to say "yes" to and old items they were required to say "no" to, and the second comparison was between old items they were required to say .'no'' to and new items.
In the visual memory condition, the probability of correctly responding "yes" to read words was significantly larger than the probability of incorrectly responding "yes" to heard words, F( 1, 19) = 25.48, MSE = 0.018. However, the probability of incorrectly responding "yes" to heard words did not differ significantly from the probability of incorrectly responding "yes" to new words, F(1, 19) = 0.77, iMSE = 0.008. In the auditory memory condition, the probability of correctly responding "yes" to heard words was significantly larger than the probability of incorrectly responding "yes" to read words, F(1, 19) = 83.76, MSE = 0.008. Additionally, the probability of incorrectly responding "yes" to read words was significantly larger than the probability of incorrectly responding "yes" to new words, F(1, 19) = 6.79, iMSE = 0.007.
Source monitoring conditional on the recognition response. Table 8 contains the probability of saying "yes" on the source monitoring task, conditional on the response made on the recognition task (remember, know, or new) as a function of type of word (read or heard) and source monitoring condition (visual or auditory). Participants were dropped from a particular combination of source monitoring condition and type of word if they had a zero probability of making one of the three possible recognition responses for that condition and type of word. The resulting n values Source monitoring. Note. P(yes) = probability of saying "yes."
are presented in Table 8 . Because the n values were low for new words in both the visual and auditory memory conditions and because we had no specific hypotheses regarding these words, we only analyzed the results for read and heard words. Two planned comparisons were conducted within each of the four combinations of source monitoring condition (visual vs. auditory) and type of word (read vs. heard). One comparison was between "yes" responses on the source monitoring task, conditional on remember and know responses on the recognition task, and the other was between "yes" responses on the source monitoring task, conditional on know and new responses on the recognition task. For read words in the visual memory condition, the probability of correctly responding "yes", conditional on a remember response, was significantly larger than the same probability conditional on a know response, F(1, 18) = 6.57, MSE = 0.052. However, this comparison was not significant when the results of the 4 doubtful participants were discarded, F(1, 14) = 3.05, MSE = 0 . 0 5 4 ,~ = ,103. Additionally, the probability of correctly responding "yes", conditional on a know response, was significantly larger than the same probability conditional on a new response, F(1, 18) = 23.27, MSE = 0.019.
In contrast, for heard words in the visual memory condition, the probability of incorrectly responding "yes", conditional on a remember response, was equivalent to the same probability conditional on a know response. The probability of incorrectly responding "yes", conditional on a know response, was significantly larger than the same probability, conditional on a new response, F(1, 19) = 11.48, MSE = 0.029.
For heard words in the auditory memory condition the probability of correctly responding "yes", conditional on a remember response, was larger, but not significantly so, than the same probability, conditional on a know response, F(1, 19) = 2.46, MSE = 0.061. However, the probability of correctly responding "yes," conditional on a know response, was significantly larger than the same probability, conditional on a new response, F(1, 19) = 73.06, MSE = 0.016.
The overall pattern of results for read words in the auditory memory condition was very similar to the pattern for heard words in the visual memory condition. That is, the probability of incorrectly responding "yes" conditional on a remember response was larger, but not significantly so, than the same probability conditional on a know response, F(1, 19) = 2.15, MSE = 0.063. Additionally, the probability of incorrectly responding "yes" conditional on a know response was significantly larger than the same probability conditional on a new response, F(1, 19) = 6.64, MSE = 0.023. When the 6 doubtful participants were dropped from the analysis, this comparison just missed statistical significance, F(1, 13) = 4.32, iMSE = 0 . 0 2 6 ,~ = .058.
Last, we conducted separate analyses on remember and know responses to read and heard words in the visual and auditory test conditions. These analyses required that we drop 1 participant Until now we have been concerned with between-subjects comparisons and have used the standard error of the mean to make the presentation of the results simpler and shorter For the within-subject comparisons in Experiments 2 and 3, we report tests of significance We adopted this approach to shorten the presentation and because there was a possibility for confusion regarding whether the standard errors in these experiments referred to the means or the differences between means 
55).
The means reported here differ from those reported in Table 8 because a participant in the visual condition was excluded from the analyses.
Discussion
The probability of saying "yes" on the source monitoring task, conditional on a remember response, was larger than the same probability conditional on a know response when the "yes" response was correct. The difference was significant for read words but not for heard words. This result is consistent with previous findings showing that source monitoring judgments, or listmembership judgments, are higher following remember responses than following know responses (Perfect, Mayes, Downes, & Van Eijk, 1996; Reder et al., 2000) . However, the current study, unlike the previous research, obtained the two judgments on separate test trials. When two judgments are made on the same trial, the knowledge that a second judgment will be required could distort the first judgment.
Additionally, there was a significant crossover interaction between test condition (visual vs. auditory) and type of word (read vs. heard). That is, in the visual test condition, the probability of saying "yes" to a read word, conditional on a remember response, was higher than the probability of saying "yes" to a heard word, conditional on a remember response. However, in the auditory test condition, the probability of saying "yes" to a read word, conditional on a remember response, was lower than the probability of saying "yes" to a heard word, conditional on a remember response. We cannot infer from these results that participants accessed modality-specific information when they made a remember response on Test 1. Nevertheless, even if remember responses only represent high-confidence old responses (Donaldson, 1996; Hirshman & Master, 1997) , we can still conclude that modality-specific information is likely to be available on a subsequent source monitoring test when the participant responds remember on an earlier test.
When the probability of saying "yes", conditional on a remember response, was incorrect, the pattern of results was not that different from the pattern obtained when the "yes" response was correct, although the magnitude of the effect was reduced. For read words in the auditory memory condition, the probability of a "yes" response was larger (but not significantly so) following a remember response than it was following a know response. For heard words in the visual memory condition, the probability of a "yes" response was the same following a remember response as it was following a know response. However, in these conditions, the process dissociation framework predicts that the probability of incorrectly responding "yes" following a remember response should be smaller than that which follows a know response. That is, if a remember response is based (at least in part) on the recollection of source-specific information, this should increase the probability of a "yes" response when the recollected information is congruent with the required answer and decrease the probability when it is incongruent with the required answer.
The probability of saying "yes" on the source monitoring task, conditional on a know response, was consistently higher than the same probability conditional on a new response. This occurred in those conditions where saying "yes" was correct and where it was incorrect. If saying "yes" on the source monitoring task is taken as an indication of recollection, this finding would imply that there is a fairly substantial correlation between recollection on Test 2 and familiarity on Test 1 , which would violate the assumptions of the process dissociation procedure. However, it seems probable that participants are responding "yes" on the basis of familiarity. If this were occurring, then the observed relationship between source monitoring and the know versus new responses on the recognition test would be expected within the process dissociation framework. Note that the exclusion task used is a compromise between an old-new task and a source monitoring task. Thus, participants may be more ready to say "yes" on the basis of familiarity alone than they would in a more traditional source monitoring task.
However, there is no explanation, within the process dissociation framework, for the significant crossover interaction observed when the source monitoring response was conditionalized on a know response on Test 1. That is, in the visual test condition, the probability of saying "yes" to a read word, given a know response, was larger than the probability of saying "yes" to a heard word, given a know response. Concomitantly, in the auditory test condition, the probability of saying "yes" to a read word, given a know response, was smaller than the probability of saying "yes" to a heard word, given a know response. This is the same crossover interaction that was observed when source monitoring responses were conditionalized on a remember response. Thus, both remember and know responses on Test 1 provide information about which words are most likely to support source-specific memories on a subsequent source monitoring task.
The finding that know responses predict the subsequent availability of source-specific information may simply indicate a problem with the remember-know procedure. That is, some participants may be responding know when they have actually recollected. Alternatively, participants' know responses may be an accurate report of their memorial experience at the time. If this is the case, this crossover interaction represents a more fundamental problem with the process dissociation framework. That is, the interaction would indicate that an item that can produce a feeling of familiarity with one set of test instructions and/or contextual conditions, can support modality-specific information with another set of test instructions and/or contextual conditions. The issue of whether the information retrieved can change with a change in test instructions and/or a change in the contextual conditions is further explored in the final experiment.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we attempted to exert more control over the information a participant would attempt to retrieve or recollect on the source monitoring task. In Experiment 2, we relied solely on the instructions to indicate the type of words participants should say "yes" to. However, the quality of the memory information may also play a role. In Experiment 2, recognition memory performance was somewhat better for heard than for read words. In addition, the task of saying "yes" to read words would have been made more difficult by the fact that the words on the first test were presented visually. If participants were having difficulty identifying the read words, some might have been more likely to attempt to retrieve or recollect information that would identify heard words because it was better quality information. To reduce this possibility, we required that the participants both read and rate the visually presented words and simply listen to the auditorially presented words on each study trial.
Method
Pnriicipnnis. Twenty-four introductory psychology students at the University of Queensland participated for course credit. All of them were assigned to the one condition.
The experiment was a replication of the visual memory condition of Experiment 2 except that on the study trial the participants were required to rate the visually presented words for pleasantness on a 5-point scale. On the source monitoring task participants were asked to respond "yes" if they saw and rated the word.
Desigit, nmierinls, andprocedure.
Results
Examination of the postexperimental questionnaires revealed that 6 of the 24 participants gave responses that may have indicated they did not understand the distinction between a remember and a know response. Full analyses were conducted on the data both with and without the doubtful participants. Because removing the doubtful participants did not affect the interpretation of the results, findings from the analyses using all data are reported.
The probability of remember and old (remember plus know) responses and the standard error of the mean for each type of test item are presented in Table 6 . Planned comparisons examining the overall probability of recognition (a response of remember or know) indicated that the probability of responding to old words was higher than the probability of responding to new words, F(1, 23) = 287.01, MSE = 0.015. The probability of responding to read-plus-rate words was also significantly higher than the probability of responding to heard words, F( 1,23) = 29.14, MSE = 0.01 7. A second set of comparisons was carried out for the remember responses: The probability of a remember response was greater for old words (read-plus-rate or heard) than it was for new words, F(1, 23) = 106.45, MSE = 0.022. In addition, the probability of a remember response was greater for read-plus-rate words than it was for heard words, F(1, 23) = 39.25, MSE = 0.014. Inspection of the means and standard errors in Table 6 also indicates that the recognition of heard words in Experiments 2 and 3 were very similar.
The probability of responding "yes" on the source monitoring task as a function of item type (read, heard, or new) is presented in Table 7 . Planned comparisons confirmed that the probability of correctly responding "yes" to read-plus-rate words was significantly larger than the probability of incorrectly responding "yes" to heard words, F(1,23) = 91.53, iMSE = 0.019. In addition, the probability of incorrectly responding "yes" to heard words was significantly larger than the probability of incorrectly responding "yes" to new words, F(1, 23) = 28.37, MSE = 0.005. Source monitoring conditional on the recognition response. The probability of responding "yes" on the source monitoring task conditional on a remember, know, or new judgment made on the recognition test and the n values for each item type are presented in Table 8 . The standard errors of the mean are also presented and can be used for comparison with the results of Experiment 2. Two planned comparisons were carried out for both the read-plus-rate and heard words. For read-plus-rate words, the probability of correctly responding "yes", conditional on a remember response, was significantly higher than the same probability, conditional on a know response, F(1, 20) = 31.15, iMSE = 0.036. Similarly, the probability of correctly responding "yes", conditional on a know response, was significantly higher than the same probability, conditional on a new response, F(1, 20) = 7.62, iMSE = 0.094.
The pattern was very similar for heard words. The probability of incorrectly responding "yes", conditional on a remember response, was significantly higher than the same probability, conditional on a know response, F( 1,23) = 1 1.33, iMSE = 0.022. The probability of incorrect responding "yes", conditional on a know response, was again significantly higher than the same probability, conditional on a new response, F(1, 23) = 8.35, iMSE = 0.016.
Recognition.
Source monitoring.
Discussion
The addition of the pleasantness-rating task to the visually presented words made them more memorable. On the recognition task, visually presented words had a higher overall probability of recognition and a higher probability of a remember response than did the heard words. On the final source monitoring task, visually presented words were also very likely to be correctly identified, especially if the response had been remember on the recognition task. Recognition responses to heard words in Experiments 2 and 3 were very similar, but performance on the source monitoring task, conditional on the recognition response, differed. In Experiment 2, the probability of incorrectly responding "yes", conditional on a remember response, was equivalent to the same probability, conditional on a know response. In Experiment 3 the probability of incorrectly responding "yes", conditional on a remember response, was significantly higher than the same probability, conditional on a know response.
Note that visual information may well be stored when words are presented on Test 1. However, the storage of visual information cannot explain the differences in results for the visual conditions of Experiments 2 and 3. The requirement that participants rate for pleasantness in Experiment 3 increased discriminability and should have reduced the possibility of misattributing visual information stored during Test 1 to visual information resulting from presentation at study. If the possibility of a misattribution was reduced in Experiment 3, then the probability of incorrectly responding "yes" to auditory words following a remember response should have decreased. Instead, this probability increased, both with respect to the same response in the visual test condition of Experiment 2 and relative to the probability of an incorrect "yes" response following a know response in Experiment 3. In addition, the results from the auditory test condition in Experiment 2, which cannot be explained by this type of misattribution, converge with the findings of Experiment 3.
Final Discussion
In the process dissociation procedure there are two responses that are indicative of recollection failure: the failure to recognize an old item under inclusion instructions (inclusion error) and the false recognition of an old item under exclusion instructions (exclusion error). Under the assumptions of the process dissociation procedure, the ratio of the probability of the first state to the second state is [ 1 -P(F)]/P(F). If the process dissociation test is followed by a second test, which is correlated with recollection on the first test but independent of the presence or absence of familiarity on the first test, the ratio of the unconditional probabilities, [l -P(F)]/P(F), should equal the ratio of the same probabilities conditional on performance on the second test, P(R n F 1 Rc)/P(R n F 1 Rc). The same analysis applies to the remember-know paradigm if we make Jacoby et al.'s (1998) assumption that aknow response represents familiarity without recollection and a new response represents the absence of both familiarity and recollection. In Experiment 1 participants studied two lists. The variables manipulated included processing similarity (where either one or both lists were studied as pairs) and temporal similarity (where the interval either separated or followed the two study lists). The participants were tested in either the inclusion or exclusion condition of the process dissociation procedure. This test was followed by a second test where participants were provided the same probe word used in Test 1 and were asked to use it to recall the other member of the study pair. Cued-recall performance was clearly correlated with indicators of recollection on the first test, as the probability of saying "yes", conditional on successful recall, was lower than the unconditional probability in those conditions where recall would have provided evidence to say no. In addition, the conditional probability was larger than the unconditional probability in those conditions where recall would have enhanced the probability of saying "yes". Nevertheless, in those conditions where recollection should have been absent (inclusion and exclusion errors), there were significant differences between the ratios of the conditional and unconditional probabilities for three of the four combinations of processing and temporal similarity. The conclusion was that an exclusion error was a better predictor of a subsequent successful attempt at recall than was an inclusion error. Knowlton and Squire (1995, Experiment 3) gave participants a remember-know test after a 10-min interval and the same test a week later. When we applied the two-test analysis developed in this article to their data set, there was a dramatic change in the ratios of the conditional and unconditional probabilities. The conclusion was that a know response was a better predictor of a subsequent remember response than was a new response.
We performed a similar two-test analysis on the results of our Experiment 2 . In the visual test condition, a know response to a read item was more likely to be followed by a "yes" response on the source monitoring task than was a know response to a heard item. In contrast, in the auditory test condition, a know response to a read item was less likely to be followed by a "yes" response than was a know response to a heard item. This was the same crossover interaction that was observed following a remember response. It seems that know responses as well as remember responses predict which items are likely to support the recovery of source-specific information (recollection) on a subsequent test.
When translated into the terminology of the process dissociation framework, these findings imply that those states where familiarity but not recollection is assumed to occur (exclusion errors and know responses) are more likely to be followed by evidence for recollection than those states where neither familiarity nor recollection is assumed to occur (inclusion errors and new responses). In other words, there is evidence for a degree of dependency between the estimates of recollection and familiarity.
This evidence for dependency cannot discriminate between a problem with the experimental methodology and a more fundamental dependency produced by a reliance on the same underlying memory representations. For example, the observed dependency could be achieved if participants failed to attend to some items during the study trial, producing failures in both familiarity and recollection. This is an unlikely explanation, especially for the heard items in Experiment 2, because familiarity appears to be acquired in a relatively automatic fashion (Yonelinas, 2002) if participants attend to the studied items. Because participants cannot close their ears as they can close/avert their eyes, inattention to some study words is unlikely to occur with auditory presentation. Nevertheless, future research should either use auditory presentation or require that participants make an overt response to each of the visual study items (e.g., rate them) to ensure that participants attend to all study items.
Another possibility is that the problem may lie in the process dissociation and remember-know methodologies. That is, exclusion errors and know responses may involve some amount of recollection. In this regard, the remember-know procedure may be more problematic than the process dissociation procedure. That is, the difference between the ratios of the unconditional and condies was quite large in Knowlton and Squire's (1995) data and the crossover interaction, conditional on a know response in our Experiment 2, was almost as large as the crossover interaction conditional on a remember response. If confusion as to how to use the response categories is responsible for the observed dependency, it may be possible to reduce the confusion by changing the instructions. It should be noted, however, that the instructions used by Knowlton and Squire and those in our experiments are representative of the instructions used in these paradigms. Therefore, it is likely that many of the experiments using these methodologies have not adequately separated recollection and familiarity.
The final potential methodological problem derives from the use of the two sequential tests that our methodology (the analysis of conditional probabilities) necessitates. It is possible that participants pay more attention to exclusion errors than to inclusion errors or more attention to know responses than to new responses. This differential attention could produce differential learning that could support recollection. As we have already noted, this seems an unlikely explanation for Experiment 1, where the learning required was between the probe word and the nonpresented member of the study pair. It also seems unlikely that differential attention could engender the learning differential of 2.20: 1 .OO that is necessary to produce the change in the ratios in Knowlton and Squire's (1995) experiment.
However, some of the results from Experiments 2 and 3 go beyond a demonstration of dependence and support the assumption that the question posed to the memory system determines the order in which information is accessed. In the incongruent test conditions of Experiment 2 (heard items in the visual test condition and read items in the auditory test condition), the kind of unambiguous recollection postulated by the process dissociation framework should have led to a "no" response. Instead participants were as likely, or more likely, to say "yes" given a remember response on Test 1 as they were to say "yes" given a know response on Test 1.
The finding in Experiment 3 that the false-alarm rate in the incongruent test condition was significantly higher following a remember response than it was following a know response, in conjunction with the finding that the hit rate in the congruent test condition was significantly higher following a remember response than it was following a know response, is damaging to the process dissociation framework. That is, this framework assumes that recollection for the manner in which an item was presented or processed plays a major role in remember judgments. If this is correct, information that is playing a prominent role in Test 1 plays a prominent role in Test 2 when the test question is congruent with how the word was presented/processed but plays an inconsequential role, or even an incorrect role, when the test question is incongruent with how the word was presentedlprocessed.
One explanation for our results starts with Donaldson's (1996) and Hirshman and Master's (1997) proposals that remember responses are simply associated with higher levels of familiarity. This assumption can explain why false-alarm rates are higher in the incongruent test conditions following a remember response than following a know response. That is, "yes" responses in the exclusion version of the source monitoring paradigm, like remember responses, may simply indicate higher levels of familiarity. However, this explanation cannot account for the crossover interactions produced when the source monitoring response is conditionalized on either a remember or a know response. The higher rate of responding to read items than to heard items in the visual test condition and the lower rate of responding to read items than to heard items in the auditory test condition indicate that the rank ordering of familiarity must be changing between the two tests. Such a change in familiarity is predicted by both Banks's (2000) and Dennis and Humphreys's (2001) theories.
This change in the rank ordering of the read and heard words with the change in instructions is precisely the kind of result that is explained by assuming a recollective process (in addition to familiarity). However, in Experiments 2 and 3, assuming a recollective process complicates the explanation. That is, within both the process dissociation and the source monitoring framework, recollection is assumed to provide both positive information (the participant is looking for visual information and recollects visual information) and negative information (the participant is looking for visual information and recollects auditory information). If recollection is producing negative information (which would provide evidence to reject an item), it is difficult to see how false alarms in the incongruent conditions can be as high, or higher, following remember responses as they are following know responses. This is especially true within the process dissociation framework for two reasons. First, in this framework, false recollection can, at best, play a minor role because any substantial level of false recollection would distort the estimates of recollection and familiarity. Second, because of the assumption that recollection and familiarity are independent, a remember response is not a predictor of familiarity, which it would need to be to produce the increase in the false-alarm rate.
The source monitoring framework (Johnson, et al., 1993; Qin et al., 2001) would be more in agreement with the results of Experiments 2 and 3 because the framework does not assume independence and does not rule out false recollections. For example, Marsh and Hicks (1998) also used the exclusion format to test source monitoring. They found that accuracy was higher when the test question was congruent with how the word had been presentedlprocessed than it was when it was incongruent. Marsh and Hicks concluded that the information examined depended on the question. One way to interpret Marsh and Hicks' conclusion is to assume that their participants were searching their memories for congruent information and were sometimes prematurely stopping their search before incongruent information was found. We refer to search models such as this, where the order in which information is retrieved does not vary as a function of the information being sought, as nondirective search models. If we also assume that read words have stronger auditory information than do new words (false recollection) and that heard words have stronger visual information than new words, it is certainly possible that a nondirective search would increase the error rate on incongruent words.
It seems unlikely, however, that a nondirected search would actually produce a higher error rate following a remember response than following a know response, in the incongruent conditions. To produce this result, we need to make two assumptions.
The first assumption is that the incorrect information stored with words where the Test 1 response was know is weaker than the incorrect information stored with words where the Test 1 response was remember. If the incorrect information recovered following a know response is weaker than the incorrect information recovered following a remember response, participants will be less likely to incorrectly respond "yes" to know words than to remember words. In itself, this will not produce the results we found in Experiments 2 and 3. We must still assume that those occasions where participants recollect the correct modality information from an incongruent word do not outweigh those occasions where they respond incorrectly on the basis of terminating their search after first recollecting the incorrect information from such a word. In a nondirected search it is difficult to guarantee that the information correctly recollected will not outweigh information incorrectly recollected. However, any model, including Banks's (2000) and Dennis and Humphreys's (2001) models, in which the question helps determine which information first emerges from the memory-access process can readily predict the results from Experiments 2 and 3.
As a final point, finding evidence for a degree of dependency between recollection and familiarity questions the interpretation of the estimates of familiarity obtained from the process dissociation and remember-know procedures. The evidence (i.e., this study and Marsh & Hicks, 1998) indicating changes in the information used, which are determined by changes in the instructions, also casts doubt on the estimates that have been obtained using the process dissociation procedure. In future, it may be useful to instruct participants in an exclusion condition to search for both positive and negative information when deciding at test. However, this will not remedy the dependency problem. Furthermore, extant estimates of recollection and familiarity are potentially affected by participants' failure to utilize negative information in the exclusion condition.
At this point, there may appear to be a contradiction. If existing estimates of familiarity and recollection are unreliable, how can there be so much evidence obtained from the process dissociation and remember-know procedures that supports the independence of recollection and familiarity. We think that the answer is that the existing analyses of these data support dual processes or dual factors but do not discriminate between independence and dependence. For example, assume that recollection is completely dependent on familiarity (e.g., Humphreys, 1976 Humphreys, , 1978 Humphreys & Bain, 1983) 5 and that R equals the probability of recollection conditional on familiarity. The expressions for the inclusion and es are given in Equations 6 and 7.
P(1) = P(F).
( 7 ) P(E) = [ l -P(R)]P(F).
The difference between the inclusion and exclusion probabilities is P(F)P(R), which is the unconditional probability of recollection. Both the independence and the dependence positions agree that the difference between the inclusion and exclusion probabilities is an estimate of recollection, so this estimate is unaffected by the evidence we have provided for a degree of dependency between recollection and familiarity. Furthermore, both the independence and dependency positions agree that P(E)/[ 1 -P(1) + P(E)] is an estimate of the probability of recognition-familiarity, conditional on recollection failure (see Humphreys et al., 2000; Humphreys & Maguire, 2003) . If we also assume that familiarity is totally insensitive to disruption, then the dependency assumption predicts that manipulations, such as speeded responding at test, will leave the P(1) unchanged. Alternately, the independence assumption predicts that P(E)/[ 1 -P(1) + P(E)] will remain unchanged. Neither prediction is fully confirmed in existing data (Bain & Humphreys, 1988; Humphreys & Bain, 1983; Yonelinas, 2002) , presumably because familiarity is not entirely insensitive to disruption and/or because the reality lies somewhere between independence and total dependency. Although the dependency position does not predict that the probability of recognition conditional on recollection failure will be totally insensitive to disruption, it is generally comfortable with demonstrations of dissociations and double dissociations between estimates of recollection and estimates of recognition conditional on recollection failure. Likewise, the independence position does not predict the total insensitivity of P(1) to disruption. Nevertheless, it also is generally comfortable with demonstrations of dissociations and double dissociations between the overall probability of recognition and the estimate of recollection. Note that the investigation of the possibility of dual processes in recognition began with demonstrations of dissociations and double dissociations between recognition and recall so there is substantial evidence for their existence (Humphreys & Bain, 1983) .
Similarly, for both the independence and dependency positions, the probability of a remember response is an estimate of recollection; and one minus the probability of a know response divided by one minus the probability of a remember response is an estimate of recognition-familiarity that is conditional on recollection failure. When coupled with the assumption that familiarity is insensitive to disruption, the dependency position predicts that the overall probability of recognition will be insensitive to disruption, whereas the independence position predicts that the probability of a know response divided by one minus the probability of a remember response will be insensitive. Both positions share the prediction that it should be possible to produce dissociations and double dissociations between the probability of a remember response and the probability of a know response divided by one minus the probability of a remember response, and between the overall probability of recognition and the probability of a remember response.
It is possible that a meta-analysis would show that overall measures of recognition are more sensitive to disruptive measures than are estimates of recognition-familiarity, conditional on recollection failure. If this were to be the case, it would provide evidence that the relationship between familiarity and recollection is toward the independence end of the continuum. However, until this analysis is performed, all we can conclude from the existing analyses is that they support two processes or, more precisely, two factors in recognition.
' These authors talked about item and relational information and assumed that item information was more resistant to disruption than was relational information. As long as recollection and familiarity are treated as generic terms, we can equate item information with familiarity and relational information with recollection.
Conclusions
We have one methodological and two substantive conclusions. The methodological conclusion is that our use of two separated tests in conjunction with our analysis of what the conditional probabilities should look like, given the process dissociation framework assumptions, have considerable potential for enhancing our understanding of recollection and familiarity.
The first of the substantive conclusions is that there is evidence for a degree of dependency between estimates of recollection and familiarity obtained from the process dissociation and rememberknow procedures. This finding does not invalidate these procedures. However, it does indicate that we need to be cautious about interpreting the estimates of familiarity that are obtained with the procedures.
The second substantive conclusion is that it is likely that the information that first emerges from the memory-access process depends in part on the question that is posed to the memory system. The question that is posed depends on the test instructions and presumably the retrieval set that this and other task variables (e.g., those that change the memorability of different kinds of information) engender in the participant.
